Vacco v. Quill
Supreme Court of the United States (1996)
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III
ASSIGNING DIMINISHED LEGAL PROTECTION TO
A LIFE OF DIMINISHED MEDICAL QUALITY
FOLLOWS DANGEROUS HISTORICAL PRECEDENT
In evaluating the state's interest in preserving and protecting a
person's life, the Ninth Circuit determined that the strength of the
interest depends, in part, on the person's medical condition; when
the person is terminally ill and wants to die, the strength of the
state interest is low. 79 F.3d at 837. Similarly, the Second
Circuit concluded -- unnecessarily for its equal protection analysis,
as elaborated supra -- that the state's interest in preserving
life "lessens as the potential for life diminishes." 80 F.3d at 729.
In so doing, the courts below all but nullified this Court's
observation that "a State may properly decline to make judgments about
the 'quality' of life that a particular individual may enjoy, and
simply assert an unqualified interest in the preservation of human
life." Cruzan, supra, 497 U.S. at 282.
Historical precedent confirms the wisdom of allowing society to treat
human life, whatever its medical "quality", as an inherent good that
deserves state protection. One need look no further than the contemporary
example of the Netherlands, where many physicians have apparently engaged
in nonvoluntary euthanasia despite that nation's limited authorization of
only voluntary euthanasia. The New York State Task Force on Life and the
Law described this "abuse" as "an inevitable byproduct of the transition
from policy to practice" of permitting the taking of human life "as a
'therapeutic' alternative." When Death Is Sought, supra, at 133-34.
The history of the German euthanasia program earlier this century, under
which some 200,000 mentally ill or physically disabled people were put to
death by German doctors, see generally M. Burleigh, Death and
Deliverance: 'Euthanasia' in Germany 1900-45 (Cambridge Press 1994),
also bears consideration. Burleigh cites Binding and Hoche's 1920 tract
Permission for the Destruction of Life Unworthy of Life -- "by far
the most influential contribution to the debate on euthanasia" -- as being
premised on "the idea that every individual had sovereign powers to dispose
of his or her own life as he or she saw fit; specifically to commit
suicide." Upon that foundation the authors constructed a model that would
lead to widespread medical killing in the name of mercy and social
utilitarianism. Death and Deliverance, supra at 15-17.
In 1949, Dr. Leo Alexander, chief medical consultant to the prosecution at
the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal, offered this trenchantly chilling
analysis of the origins of the euthanasia program in Germany:
"Whatever proportions these crimes finally assumed, it
became evident to all who investigated them that they
had started from small beginnings. The beginnings at first
were merely a subtle shift in emphasis in the basic attitude
of the physicians. It started with the acceptance of the
attitude, basic in the euthanasia movement, that there is
such a thing as life not worthy to be lived. This attitude
in its early stages concerned itself merely with the
severely and chronically sick. Gradually, the sphere of
those to be included in this category was enlarged to
encompass the socially unproductive, the ideologically
unwanted, the racially unwanted and finally all non-Germans.
But it is important to realize that the infinitely small
wedged-in lever from which this entire trend of mind
received its impetus was the attitude toward the
nonrehabilitable sick."
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Alexander, Medical Science Under Dictatorship, 241, New England Journal
of Medicine 40, 46 (1949). Dr. Alexander sounded a warning to his fellow
Americans:
"American physicians are still far from the point of
thinking of killing centers, but they have arrived at
a danger point of thinking, at which likelihood of
full rehabilitation is considered a factor that should
determine the amount of time, effort and cost to be
devoted to a particular type of patient....Americans
should remember that the enormity of a euthanasia
movement is present in their own midst." Id.
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We do not mean to suggest that constitutionalizing a right to assisted
suicide is likely to lead to the type of moral collapse that occurred in the
German medical profession earlier this century. As two commentators have
noted, however, we dare not ignore the lessons of that dark era:
"We have witnessed too much history to disregard how easily
a society may disvalue the lives of the 'unproductive.'
The 'angel of mercy' can become the fanatic, bringing the
'comfort' of death to some who do not clearly want it, then
to others who 'would really be better off dead,' and finally,
to classes of 'undesirable persons,' which might include the
terminally ill, the permanently unconscious, the severely
senile, the pleasantly senile, the retarded, the incurably or
chronically ill, and perhaps, the aged. . . . In the current
environment, it may well prove convenient - and all too easy
- to move from recognition of an individual's 'right to die'
(to us, an unfortunate phrasing in the first instance) to a
climate enforcing a 'duty to die.'"
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Siegler & Weisbard, Against the Emerging Stream: Should Fluids and
Nutritional Support be Discontinued?, 145 Archives of Internal Medicine
130-31 (1985). Yet another commentator issued this bleak observation:
"What makes the administrative mass killings so outstanding
is not their numbers, their efficiency, or their cruelty,
but the fact that they occurred in an epoch when nobody thought
it was humanly or socially possible. Therein lies their
deepest lesson. If it was possible then, why not again? What
has fundamentally changed? The curtain may have gone down --
but only for the intermission." F. Wertham, The German
Euthanasia Program 31 (1980).
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In the decisions below, we detect -- ever so faintly, ever so benignly, but
ever so ominously -- the rustling of the curtain once again.
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