A. The Pervasiveness of the Problem
Even if United States v. Weiss were only an isolated instance
of justice miscarried as a result of prosecutorial appeal to racial
or ethnic bias, it would behoove this Court to grant a writ of
certiorari to ensure Weiss' constitutional right to a fair trial.
Sadly, though, this is by no means all that exceptional a case.
What happened here happens shockingly often in federal and state
courts across the United States -- making it all the more imperative
that this Court grant Weiss' petition.
Consider the following sampling of relatively recent reported cases
of improper prosecutorial appeals to racial prejudice (see generally
B. Gershman, Prosecutorial Misconduct, Sec. 10.2(d) (1985)):
-- United States v. Doe, 903 F.2d 16, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1990):
"[W]hat is happening in Washington, D.C. is that Jamaicans are coming
in, they're taking over the retail sale of crack... people just like
this just like this."
-- United States v. Hernandez, supra, 865 F.2d at 927: "Each of
you by the verdict that is represented by the evidence will send a
clear message to Cuban drug dealers..."
-- McFarland v. Smith, supra, 611 F.2d at 416: "[T]he fact is
that Officer Dorman is black and the Defendant is black... If [Officer
Dorman] is lying she is lying against a member, a person that is black...
a member of her own race. You use your common sense about that."
-- Withers v. United States, 602 F.2d 124, 125 (6th Cir. 1979):
"Not one white witness has been produced in this case that contradicts
[the victim's] position in this case."
-- Miller v. North Carolina, 583 F.2d 701, 704 & at n.3 (4th Cir.
1978): "She told you that each of these black men had intercourse with
her and that they passed the knife from one to another... Don't you
know and I argue if [consent to intercourse] was the case she could not
come in this courtroom and relate the story that she has from this stand
to you good people, because I argue to you that the average white woman
abhors anything of this type in nature that had to do with a black man.
It is innate within us..."
-- Kellv v. Stone, 514 F.2d 18, 19 (9th Cir. 1975): "[M]aybe the
next time it won't be a little black girl from the other side of the
tracks; maybe it will be somebody that you know... And maybe next time
he'll use the knife."
-- United States v. Sanchez, 482 F.2d 5, 8 (5th Cir. 1973) "[B]y
golly, he should have enough machismo and chicannismo to take the stand
and tell you the truth..."
-- United States v. Horne, 423 F.2d 630, 631 (9th Cir. 1970): "And
another thing I am tired of: Is [defense counsel] trying to let these
people hide behind their race?"
-- United State v. Grey, 422 F.2d 1043, 1045 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 967 (1970): The prosecutor asked a black defendant's
character witness whether he knew that the defendant was "running around
with a white go-go dancer."
-- Weddington v. State, 545 A.2d 607, 610 (Del. 1988): "Mr.
Weddington, isn't it true that you got Blue and Henry to go up to Indiana
with you because you told them there was some loose white women up there?"
-- State v. Belgarde, 755 P.2d 174, 175 (Wash. 1988): "I remember
Wounded Knee, South Dakota. Do any of you? It is one of the most chilling
events of the last decade. You might talk that over when you get in there.
That was the American Indian Movement. That was a faction of the American
Indians that were militant, that were butchers, that killed
indiscriminately Whites and their own."
-- People v. Thomas, 129 A.D.2d 596, 597 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App.
Div. 2d Dept. 1987): "I would submit to you that if three white males
jumped out of a green Plymouth Volarie in this neighborhood and ran up
to you you might, you just might tend to think these are not muggers,
these could be police officers."
-- People v. Walker, 66 A.D.2d 863, 864-65 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App.
Div. 2d Dept. 1978): "Teddy is trying to save face. He broke the code of
the Negro community, two women in one town. That's a no-no... You want to
talk, but the big man comes in, a big man who's above the code of the
community. These rules don't apply to me. They apply to the niggers."
-- Commonwealth v. Graziano, 331 N.E.2d 808, 813 (Mass. 1975):
"We've even got the godfather in this case. The godfather, we've got the
wedding, we've got every part of it."
Some of these cases resulted in a new trial. Others did not. In each of
them, though, the appellate court found the prosecutor's rhetoric improper.
If nothing else, the picture that clearly emerges is that although it has
long been a matter of hornbook law that racially biased prosecutorial
presentations are a violation of due process, such presentations continue
at an alarming rate. What was true twelve years ago when the Second Circuit
cautioned that "the evils of racial prejudice lurk too frequently throughout
the administration of criminal justice, McFarland v. Smith, supra,
611 F.2d at 419, is certainly no less true today.
It is especially reprehensible when those evils are instigated by a government
official. As this Court has observed:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore,
in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case,
but that justice shall be done... It is as much his duty to
refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring
about a just one.
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Berger v. United States, supra, 295 U.S. at 88. Or, as the Eleventh
Circuit has articulated the point, our review of alleged errors in argument
must be informed by an awareness that the prosecutorial mantle of authority
can intensify the effect on the jury of any misconduct." Brooks v. Kemp,
762 F.2d 1383, 1399 (llth Cir. 1985).
Granting Weiss' petition for a writ of certiorari will afford this Court an
opportunity to speak firmly on this sensitive issue, and to delineate clear
guidelines for courts to determine the presence of prejudicial racial or
ethnic bias in prosecutorial rhetoric. If courts can conclude, as the
majority did here, that allusions to negative stereotypes can fall 'within
the bounds of proper argument,' the need for such guidelines becomes
painfully apparent.