(ii) Requiring a New Trial Without a Specific Finding that the Error
Was Not Harmless:
The second "'tension" noted above -- relating to the appropriate remedy
when there is a determination of improper appeal to bias may also affect
the outcome of this case. The specific question is whether the injection
of prejudice requires automatic reversal, or whether it is governed by
the "harmless error" doctrine.
At least one court has held that harmless error analysis must be applied
whenever the prosecutor's rhetoric injects racial bias into the jury's
deliberations. United States v. Doe, supra, 903 F.2d at 27-28
(finding that government had not met its burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that prejudicial prosecutorial remarks were harmless).
See also United States v. Parker, 877 F.2d 327, 332 (5th Cir.
1989). Other courts have held that automatic reversal is the proper
remedy. Miller v. North Carolina, supra, 583 F.2d at 708;
Weddington v. State, supra, 545 A.2d at 614-615. Yet other
courts have taken note of the issue without expressly deciding it.
United States ex rel. Haynes v. McKendrick, supra, 481 F.2d at
161; Carter v. Rafferty, 621 F. Supp. 533, 546 (D.N.J. 1985),
aff'd on other grounds, 781 F.2d 993 (3d Cir. 1986).
The theory for requiring automatic reversal is that arguments appealing
to racial bias necessarily strike at the heart of the defendant's right
to an impartial jury. "Racially prejudicial remarks are... so likely to
prevent the jury from deciding a case in an impartial manner and so
difficult, if not impossible, to correct once introduced, that a good
argument for applying a more absolute standard may be made." United
States ex rel. Haynes v. McKendrick, supra, 481 F.2d at 161. Indeed,
"current studies lend empirical support to the contention that arguments
designed to invoke racial stereotypes will have a pervasive influence
on the jury." Note, Arguments Appealing to Racial Prejudice:
Uncertainty Impartiality and the Harmless Error Doctrine, 64 Ind.
L.J. 375, 385 (1989). See also Note, Developments in the Law - Race and
the Criminal Process, supra, 101 Harv. L. Rev. at 1594-95. Stated
simply, when the thirteenth juror is present in the jury chamber, there
exists a "structural defect[ ] in the constitution of the trial mechanism,
which def[ies] analysis by 'harmless-error' standards." Arizona v.
Fulimante, lll S. Ct. 1246, 1265 (1991).
Of course, even if this Court determines that harmless error analysis
should apply to cases of prosecutorial appeal to racial prejudice, the
specific circumstances of this case may lead to the conclusion that the
error here was not harmless -- a conclusion the dissenting judge below
in fact reached. 930 F.2d at 203 (Restani, J., dissenting). In either
event, this case presents this Court with an excellent opportunity to
provide firm guidance to the lower courts on several issues that cry
out for definitive resolution.