Observations On And Beyond Rabbi Alfred Cohen's “Daat Torah”
Yitzchak Kasdan

Observations On And Beyond
Rabbi Alfred Cohen's “Daat Torah”

Yitzchak Kasdan^*

Rabbi Alfred Cohen's article on “Daat Torah” (Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society, Spring 2003), posted with permission elsewhere on this site (jlaw.com/Articles/cohen_DaatTorah.pdf), is a welcome, extensive re-examination of the subject. In at least two not inconsequential respects, Rabbi Cohen brings full circle the public discussion about this topic that -- with respect to popular Jewish, English language periodicals and books -- first began 40 years ago with the publication of an article that appeared in The Jewish Observer. At the same time, however, as comprehensive as he is, Rabbi Cohen overlooks an important, well-grounded basis for at least one element of his understanding of “Daat Torah” that only has recently been emphasized in English publications. In these regards, and as I attempt to demonstrate in greater detail below,:

(i) Rabbi Cohen provides an important gemara and Rishon source -- Bava Batra 12a as explained by the Ritva -- that has not been well publicized (and perhaps even inadvertently or otherwise been ignored) by those critical of the concept of “Daat Torah” throughout the years, but which appears was significant to the author of the seminal article on the topic that appeared in the early Jewish Observer issue, Rabbi Bernard Weinberger. Equally important, Rabbi Cohen steers the conversation back towards the original parameters of “Daat Torah” that Rabbi Weinberger attempted to set forth in his piece -- balancing, if you will, the place of “Daat Torah” in personal and/local issues versus in those with broader, national communal implications.

(ii) Yet, as wide-reaching as Rabbi Cohen's article is, Rabbi Cohen's article misses an important, well and long established foundation for “Daat Torah” that has been stressed only recently in English essays and shiurim, primarily by Rav Dovid Cohen. That is, the relationship between concepts of “Daat Torah” and malchut (kingship), which “crown” Rabbis assumed as noted in traditional and historical sources. This relationship is useful in understanding why, according to many including Rabbi (Alfred) Cohen, “Daat Torah” “must” be followed.²

Rabbi Bernard Weinberger's Jewish Observer Article

In October 1963, Rabbi Bernard Weinberger, then the Rav of Young Israel of Brooklyn, an instructor in Yeshiva Rabbi Jacob Josef and member of the Rabbinical Alliance of America, published “The Role of the Gedolim” in the second ever issue of Agudath Israel of America's The Jewish Observer. Therein, Rabbis Weinberger described Daat Torah as involving

a lot more than Torah weltanschauung or a Torah saturated perspective. It assumes a special endowment or capacity to penetrate objective reality, recognize the facts as they 'really' are, and apply pertinent Halachic principles. It is a form of 'Ruach HaKodesh,' as it were, which borders if not remotely on the periphery of prophecy.

Rabbi Weinberger went on to explain that a “Godol” who possesses this “ingredient [i.e., “Daat Torah,”] that transcends scholarship alone or piety alone and that makes one a Godol,” cannot be “deliberately elevate[d];” rather, there are few Gedolim, and we all intuitively know who they are.” In that regard, as well, Rabbi Weinberger noted that “it is easy to grasp that no one can force upon another the acceptance of a 'Godol.'”

Critically, too, Rabbi Weinberger distinguished between the jurisdiction of the “local Rabbi” over community matters, and that of the “Gedolim” in national issues affecting “K'lall Yisroel.” For Rabbi Weinberger, himself (as noted above) then a pulpit Rabbi, “the role of Gedolim is not intended to replace the authority of the local Rabbi, within its proper confines.” According to Rabbi Weinberger, only “issues of Torah policy that are [of] K'lall significance will of necessity be referred to a 'Godol'” as to which, in those circumstances, the “'Gedolim' must be the final authority” and as to which the lay community worker is “confronted with demonstrating faith in 'Gedolim' and subduing his own alleged acumen in behalf of the Godol's judgement of the facts.”³ By contrast, “organization policy in kashrut standards and local synagogue policy, relationships with other similar groups are all within the purview of their [i.e., the individual person's] own rabbinic authority.” On those type of “matters that affect his synagogue and community,” “the local Rabbi is the supreme authority,” and he should not be reduced to “puppet” status, but should be called upon by the laity “to answer questions on Torah law” with the ability to refer, in turn, “complex situations” to the Gedolim, as necessary.

Professor Kaplan's Criticism of Rabbi Weinberger's Understanding of 'Daat Torah”

Seventeen years after the appearance of Rabbi Weinberger's article in The Jewish Observer, Professor Lawrence Kaplan of McGill University, an acknowledged and respected translator of many important writings of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, ztl, (the “Rav”), wrote about “Rabbi Isaac Hutner's Daat Torah Perspective On the Holocaust: A Critical Analysis” in Tradition magazine published by the Rabbinical Council of America (Volume 18, No.3, Fall 1980). Subsequently, in 1992, Professor Kaplan wrote a more extensive piece entitled: “Daas Torah: A Modern Conception of Rabbinic Authority” that was published by the Orthodox Forum, a project of Yeshiva University's Rabbi Isaac Elchanan Theological Seminary (“RIETS”) in “Rabbinic Authority and Personal Autonomy” edited by Moshe Z. Sokol (Aronson Press 1992). In both of his essays, within the context of a broader attack on the notion of “Daat Torah,” Professor Kaplan specifically questioned Rabbi Weinberger's depiction of the attributes associated with that term and the traditional sources cited in its support.

In Tradition, Professor Kaplan criticized what he believed to be Rabbi Weinberger's understanding of the “quasi-divine, brooking no dissent” and “oracular nature” of “Daat Torah” which Professor Kaplan stated was “invalid' as “radically opposed to the whole process of reasoned halakhic pesak” that (in contrast to “Daat Torah”) “always leaves room for more discussion, for further analysis, and for responsible criticism . . ..” Further, Professor Kaplan described “the whole notion of Daat Torah [as] to close and suppress discussion [and thus enable] one person or group to impose, ex cathedra a personal, particular viewpoint on all persons or groups -- and no questions asked!” [All footnotes omitted.]⁴

In his longer 1992 essay, Professor Kaplan again cited Rabbi Weinberger's statement in The Jewish Observer about Daat Torah “bordering . . . on the periphery of prophecy,” describing Rabbi Weinberger's writing as “perhaps the clearest exposition of Daas Torah . . ..” ⁵ Developing the various fundamental flaws (in his mind) relating to “Daat Torah” that he first publicized in Tradition and attempting but (again from his perspective) failing to find traditional “sources” for the concept, Professor Kaplan concluded -- citing Professor Ephraim Urbach -- that “Daat Torah ideology has never been based upon authoritative halakhic sources . . ..”

Rabbi Cohen's Article

Without referencing Rabbi Weinberger, Rabbi Alfred Cohen's article, at once, though not completely, addresses Professor Kaplan's points about Rabbi Weinberger's characterization of "Daat Torah" and the ostensible lack of "authoritative halakhic sources" for it. At the same time, Rabbi Cohen's article hearkens back to, and, in many respects, echoes themes originally espoused by, Rabbi Weinberger in his 1963 essay.

One of Rabbi Cohen's primary sources for the concept of "Daat Torah" is the portion in the gemara in Bava Batra 12a and the Rishonim -- especially the Ritva⁶ -- explicating that "prophecy was taken away from the prophets" but not from the "chachamim" (sages). As brought down by Rabbi Cohen, the Ritva explains this to mean that Torah scholars perceive through their intellect -- "sechel"-- many things that others would not naturally comprehend. In fairness to Professor Kaplan, he was aware of the gemorah; however, he gave it only passing attention, focusing (to the extent he did at all) only upon the interpretation of the Ramban⁷ which, on its face, differs from that of the Ritva.⁸ Nonetheless, when one compares the Ritva to Rabbi Weinberger's statement about the "special endowment or capacity [of Daat Torah] to penetrate objective reality" and notes Rabbi Weinberger's employment of quotation marks around the word “prophetic” when he wrote in his article of the Godol's “'prophetic' prospective,” one readily sees that Rabbi Weinberger's words comport with the Ritva's understanding of the gemara. In context, it is clear that Rabbi Weinberger did not intend to mean, as Professor Kaplan could have been read to imply, that he (Rabbi Weinberger) understood today's Rabbis to possess truly prophetic capabilities in an almost literal sense of the word.⁹ In the end, as Rabbi Cohen demonstrates, the gemara in Bava Batra can be legitimately viewed as an important source for the concept of “Daat Torah”.¹⁰

Rabbi Cohen also serves Rabbi Weinberger well by stressing some similar (albeit not precisely the same) ideas originally expressed by the latter, including the importance and relevance of the pulpit Rabbi and his influential role in relation to the laity; the fact that no one can force any individual to accept one “Godol” over another; that people intuit who is considered a “Godol;” and the desirability of striving to be bound by uniform communal practice. In this manner too, Rabbi Cohen's piece is important to those who accept many of the concepts associated with “Daat Torah” though not certain views concerning its scope and as to which there may be legitimate dispute.¹¹

The Relationship Between Daat Torah and Malchut and the Issue of Submission

One of Professor Kaplan's objections to “Daat Torah,” is what he called its allegedly “modern” origin.¹² While supporting the concepts associated with the term, Rabbi Cohen nevertheless implies that he too has questions about the phrase (-- “Whether the phenomenon should be called 'Daat Torah' or not, . . ..”). To be sure, part of the resistance to “Daat Torah” stems from the implication of a phrase with limited history that there is and can only be one “Daat Torah” -- an idea that Rabbi Cohen, like Rabbi Weinberger earlier, appears to rejects. Indeed, in Rabbi Yaakov Feitman's “Daas Torah: Tapping the Source of Eternal Wisdom” (The Jewish Observer, May 1992), the author admits that the term was a “new phrase” coined as a result of the exigencies of the late 19th century. In this regard, Rabbi Cohen should have called more attention and given more space to this and the related, legitimate complaint also raised by Professor Kaplan concerning the overuse (if not misuse) of the term “Daat Torah” well beyond its apparent intent.¹³

At the same time, Rabbi Cohen apparently was unaware of another basis for “Daat Torah” that is important in dealing with Professor Kaplan's trenchant comment that the whole notion of “Daat Torah” is intended “to close and suppress discussion [and thus enable] one person or group to impose, ex cathedra a personal, particular viewpoint on all persons or groups - and no questions asked!” Rabbi Cohen apparently decries such use of “Daat Torah” -- lamenting as he does such things as the distortion of history, book censorship and blanket prohibitions -- and thus lending support to some of Professor Kaplan's objections. However, Rabbi Cohen misses an important feature of “Daat Torah” relating to the malchut, i.e., kingship, quality of “Daat Torah” that can lead to such results and that can be used to “explain” this side to “Daat Torah” which fosters such behavior.

In recent years, in an essay translated into English¹⁴ and in a related taped shiur available for wide distribution,¹⁵ Rav Dovid Cohen, a well-known and respected posek in Brooklyn, New York, has been a vocal proponent of the link between malchut and “Daat Torah” and the notion that the former is an antecedent foundation for the latter. According to Rav (Dovid) Cohen, based on sources dating back to the Rama Mipanu and in reliance on verses in the Torah itself, there was a fusion between the crowns of Torah and Kingship, such that our sages assumed the authority of a king, much like Moshe Rabbeinu held both Torah and royalty titles. As Rav (Dovid) Cohen writes in his translated essay:¹⁶ “[t]he Rabbinate as we know it [today] combines Torah authority with king authority.” Indeed, there are numerous sources -- old and of more recent vintage, direct and by implication -- for such an understanding of the sovereign role that Chazal undertook. For example, in Gitin 62a the gemara calls rabbanim, “melachim.” See also “Harrirai Kedem” (R. Michal Shurkin's sefer based on the Torah of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchk, the “Rav”) at page reish samach hei (265), where (as my brother pointed out to me) the Rav zt'l compares a mara d'aatra to a melech. Finally, see“Keser Torah: Based on the Words of Rav Hutner zt'l” found at http://www.countryyossi.com/dec98/torah3.htm (anonymous author).

Moreover, the linkage between Rabbis and royalty did not appear to be a controversial point to a reviewer in Tradition of a 1977 book by Rabbi Mendell Lewittes, "Religious Foundations of the State of Israel" (reprinted by Aronson Press in 1994). In his volume (at 87), Rabbi Lewittes bases himself upon the Ran in Drashot Haran when he states: “[I]n the absence of a kingdom, the religious authorities are able to assume the responsibilities of political leadership." Rabbi Lewittes also writes (at 56):

When the first Temple was destroyed and king and priest were banished from Israel, the prophet assumed the whole burden of leadership . . .but when, six and a half centuries later the Second Temple was destroyed and again king and prophet were banished, the chief scholar was able to assume the whole burden of leadership for a vanquished but surviving people. Thus, R. Simon could now say that in Israel 'there are three crowns: the crown of the Torah, the crown of the priesthood, and the crown of kingship' (Avot 4:13); and another Sage could add: 'Torah is greater [in its emoluments] than the priesthood and kingship.' (Avot 6;5).

When Rabbi Lewittes' book was reviewed by R. Solomon J. Spiro in Tradition (vol. 18 no. 1, Summer 1979) Rabbi Spiro wrote: "There is little radically new, provocative or controversial in the work [!!]"

Once one likens “Daat Torah” authority to the power of the king, one can "understand" to some degree (without agreeing or disagreeing) the at times, facially inflexible, unreasoned (in contrast to “reasoned” pesak Halacha) pronouncements of some Rabbis -- they do indeed act ex cathedra and their declarations are akin to a royal decree, if you will.

In this regard, see also “Emes l'Yaacov,” the writings of Rav Yaacov Kaminetzky zt'l, wherein he cites the Ibn Ezra on the pasuk in Shoftim (Deut. 17, 9) "U'vata" as the source for the prohibition of being "mored b'malchut" (rebelling against a king) because the "shofet" in the second verse there is the "melech."¹⁷ By his comment, the Ibn Ezra appears to indicate that the principle of "lo tasur"¹⁸ -- not deviating from the pronouncements of the “shofet” -- which appears only a few verses later, applies to royal pronouncements which must be obeyed regardless of their unreasonableness (and even, according to the Ran in Drashot HaRan, drasha 11, with some limitations, if they are inconsistent with the laws of the Torah itself). If this thesis is correct, then Rabbis today might still be able rely on "lo tasur," from the malchut crown that they assumed (apart from, or regardless of, any application of that principle from the aspect of their judicial powers that may still apply to them as the inheritors of the authority of the Sanhedrin which is the classic application of “lo tasur”) as a “justification” for their sometimes authoritarian decision-making approach.

One additional "source" for such a link between kinglike powers and Rabbis might also be found in lectures of Rav Soloveitchik including the drasha found in Rabbi Besdin's "Reflections of the Rav" (Vol. I) entitled "Who Is Fit To Lead The Jewish People?" at 133-37, which Hebrew version is found in "Haadam V'Olamo" ("Hamalchut b'Yisrael"). In that presentation, the Rav compared the quintessential Rebbe-teacher to a king.¹⁹ However, in the last paragraph in Rabbi Besdin's version -- which interestingly, but for reasons unknown to this writer, is not found in the Hebrew version -- the Rav distinguishes between a king and a Rebbe: "Kingship [because of its potentially autocratic nature] is, . . . sharply circumscribed. This does not prevail in the teacher-disciple relationship, where the exercise of authority is encouraged and submission to teachers is extolled." As the Rav explained (as found in both the English and Hebrew versions) "Why is this authority of man [i.e., the Rebbe] over his fellow man [the student] sanctioned? . . . [T]he authority of a teacher is not imposed; no coercion or political instrument is employed. A Torah teacher is freely accepted and joyfully embraced . . .."²⁰

The Rav, of course, did not use the term “Daat Torah.” Yet, he seems to be describing one of its characteristics when discussing the submission of students to Rabbinic teachers. In this sense, the Rav's description of the Rebbe-Talmid relationship yields the conclusion, as Rabbi (Alfred) Cohen writes, “that the advice given by Torah great scholars must be followed by Jews committed to Torah observance.”

Nevertheless, as the Rav himself was cognizant, the best “advice” is one that is “freely and joyfully embraced, “ not one that is imposed by fiat. It is not surprising, therefore, that when I went to the Rav as a student at Yeshiva University seeking his advice whether in my capacity as Editor-in-Chief of the RIETS publication “Hamevaser” to publish a potentially controversial article, the Rav told me: “I am not telling you what to do. However, if I were you I would not . . ..”

Needless to say, I heeded my Rebbe's advice.

posted to JLaw.com: 11-21-03