Lightman v. Flaum & Weinberger
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division -- Second Department

2. SECULAR COURTS MAY NOT INTERVENE IN DISPUTES WHICH REQUIRE THE INTERPRETATION OF ECCLESIASTICAL LAW.

   In rendering its decision against defendants-respondents, the court below, of necessity, asserted that "[a]bsent any religious or First Amendment implication, there is no compelling reason here to shield these Rabbis from liability." (R-19) Ironically, in its discussion rejecting the rabbis First Amendment defenses, the court then demonstrated the very grounds under the First Amendment that it should not have done anything other than dismiss this case. The lower court stated:

   In my view, [the disclosure] was not only improper, it was outrageous and most offensive… From what was done, it is palpably clear why this determination is one of apparent first impression - no member of the clergy…would dare breach the sanctity of his office to make public the type of confidential, private disclosures at issue in this case….

   Moreover, to violate such basic rights under the guise of religious necessity, conviction or the protection of the Torah, is not only wrong, it is outrageous….

   …neither defendant had a "religious obligation as a Rabbi" to make public what had been imparted to them.

   (R-19-20). Each of the foregoing statements by the lower court demonstrate why First Amendment jurisprudence, properly adhered to, requires a court to dismiss this case. The lower court's perspective, revealed by its strong rhetoric, is clearly one of secular reasoning alone, and one which seemingly cannot contemplate another, equally legitimate legal system compelling its subject to a different outcome. The court's statement reveals a basic lack of respect and understanding for the demands of religious law to the point where the court feels perfectly comfortable opining on the content of that law and dismissing defendants-respondents claims of religious obligation out of hand.

   Most tellingly, the lower court's bias in this case led it to believe that the issues in this case are those of first impression. In its discourse upon these issues, the lower court, unwittingly, raised exactly the situation reviewed and ruled upon by the Court of Appeals of Michigan prior to the lower court issuing its revised opinion on March 4, 1999. In preparing to dismiss the rabbis' First Amendment claims, the lower court stated that "it is beyond peradventure that, when one seeks the…spiritual… guidance of a member of the clergy…this is not done as a prelude to an announcement from the pulpit…." (R-19).

   In Smith v. Calvary Christian Church, 529 N.W.2d 713 (1998), plaintiff sued his pastor for disclosing, from the pulpit, his confessions of adultery. The plaintiff sued the pastor, inter alia, under Michigan's counterpart to New York's C.P.L.R.§4505. The Michigan trial court dismissed the congregant's claim in this regard, on the grounds that "whether the church required that the clergy keep confidential a member's personal disclosures was a matter of religious doctrine that the court could not determine according to civil law principles." 592 N.W.2d at 716.

   The appellate panel upheld the trial court's dismissal of this claim. The Michigan appellate court reaffirmed the principle that "[w]hen the court faces issues requiring the application of religious doctrine or ecclesiastical polity, the court ceases to have jurisdiction," and noted that the "United States Supreme Court has defined religious doctrine as ritual, liturgy of worship, and tenets of faith." 592 N.W.2d at 717, citing Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979). The court reviewed a number of precedents from several states in support of this proposition; a proposition which, we respectfully submit, applies squarely to the case at bar and requires its dismissal.